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Abstract 
 
 Using Japanese panel data for 2006-2009, this study attempts to examine how the pass 
rate of law school student taking the new bar examination influences the number of 
applicants for the law school in the following years. The major finding is that the higher 
the law school student pass rate, the greater the number of applicants for the law school 
becomes. Furthermore, the positive effect of the pass rate is larger for a prestigious 
university’s law school than for other schools. It follows that the “brand” and the 
school’s current performance are complementary in increasing demand for places in the 
law school. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It has been pointed out that the supply of lawyers in Japan is below the optimum level, 
mainly the result of the extremely low pass rate for the bar examination (e.g., Kinoshita 
2000, 2002). A new bar examination was introduced in 2006 with the aim of admitting 
larger numbers to the Japanese bar. A requirement to get permission to take the new bar 
examination is to graduate from a law school that commenced operations from 2004. 
The Justice System Reform Council (Hereafter, JSRC) originally called on law school 
administrators to provide a legal education that would be comprehensive enough to 
enable about 70 to 80 % of candidate students to pass the new bar examination (JSRC 
2001). This expected pass rate was far higher than the approximately 2-3% of the 
previous bar examination; therefore, it increased the motivation of university students to 
enter law school. Once the new law school system was formally launched, most of 
Japan’s major universities rushed to establish their own law school. Inevitably, many 
more schools were built than had originally been expected. As a consequence, the pass 
rate for the new bar examination was far lower than anticipated. This caused the law 
school market became more competitive than predicted. The numbers of applicants to 
law schools gradually decreased. Indeed, some law schools did not fill their quota of 
examinees. It became necessary for law schools to improve the quality of their 
education to survive.  
The pass rate for the previous bar examination varied widely among universities from 
which applicants had graduated. Especially, there was a large gap between the 
“prestigious universities” and others (Ramseyer and Nakazato, 1999; Nakazato et al., 
2007). It seems appropriately argued that a “prestigious position” provides a “brand” 
that can be considered as information that the quality of these universities is high. 
Applicants for law schools have good reason to demand “brand-name” law schools 
because they can be more confident in the quality of the education they will receive. 
Hence, these universities have an advantage attracting students. However, under 
conditions such as those surrounding the newly introduced bar examination, it is not 
certain that a “prestigious position” under the old bar examination would have a similar 
performance reflecting role in increasing applicants for the new bar examination. On the 
other hand, only after the results of the new bar examination were announced, could 
people who wanted to take the new bar examination use such information to select their 
law school.  
Applicants for law school obtain two kinds of information concerning the quality of 
schools; the “brand” and the current performance in the new examination. A question 
naturally arises: How does this kind of information influence the decision when 
applicants choose a law school? It is uncertain whether the relationship of the “brand” 
and its current performance is complementary when its effect on gathering applicants is 
explored. Thus the main purpose of this paper is to (1) explore the effect of a law 
school’s pass rate for the new bar examination on the following year’s number of 
applicants for the law school and (2) to investigate how “brand” influences the effect of 
the pass rate on the number of the applicants for the law school.  
 
2. The setting (situation surrounding the new bar examination). 
 
  I begin by looking at the new bar examination as well as that of the law school 
examination by using aggregated level data. Figure 1 presents the ass rates for the new 
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bar examination after its inception. From this, a constant decline can be observed in the 
pass rate. Figure 2 shows the total number of applicants for the law school entrance 
examinations. This shows that, with the exception of 2006-2007, the number of 
applicants steadily decreased. The decline is thought to further reduce the incentive to 
become a law school student. These declining tendencies were not anticipated and so it 
might be desirable to increase the supply of lawyers (Kinoshita 2009).  
For closer examination, I use an individual level data set to observe the relationship 
between the law school’s pass rate for the new bar examination and the number of 
applicants for the law school in the following year. A cursory examination of Figure 3 
reveals that the pass rate is positively associated with the number of applicants for the 
law school in the following year. This implies that, in line with intuition, the pass rate in 
the new bar examination is important information for people when they choose a law 
school.  
It is widely known that the “big five”, The University of Tokyo and Kyoto 
University, the leading national universities, and Waseda, Keio, and Chuo University, 
the leading private ones, produced a large number of successful candidates for the “old 
bar examination” (Omura et al. 2005). As well, besides The University of Tokyo and 
Kyoto University, there are five universities whose the predecessor was the imperial 
university; Hokkaido University, Tohoku University, Osaka University, Nagoya 
University, and Kyushu University. Many lawyers graduated from these universities, 
which are also considered leading universities. In this paper, these 10 universities are 
defined as a “prestigious university”. All have established law schools and these are 
defined as a “prestigious law school”.  
I divide the sample into “prestigious law schools” and “non-prestigious law schools”. 
The relationship between the pass rate for the new bar examination and the number of 
applicants for the entrance examination to the law school in the following year is seen in 
Figure 4 (a) for the “prestigious law schools” and in Figure 4 (b) for the “non 
prestigious law schools”. Consistent with the above explanation, I see from Figure 4 (a) 
that the pass rate scores and the number of applicants are located in a high and large 
area. Furthermore, Figure 4 (a) and (b) present the positive relationship between the 
pass rate and the number of applicants. The slope of the line in Figure 4 (a) is 2.9, 
slightly larger than that in Figure 4 (b), 2.7. Considering Figures 3, 4(a) and (b) jointly 
leads me to postulate a hypothesis that the pass rate in the new bar examination 
increases applicants and its effect is larger for a “prestigious law school” than other law 
schools. 
 
3. Estimated model and interpretation of results 
 
3.1. Data  
    Table 1 includes variable definitions, means (rates), standard deviations, and max 
and minimum values. The dependent variable is the number of applicants for the law 
school. The set of the independent variables is: the law school’s pass rate in the bar 
examination in the previous year, the law school’s number of quotas for taking the 
entrance examination, the number of full-time professors, and tuition fees. These data 
are from the Nikkei Career Magazine (various years). The data set used in this study is 
law school level panel data from 2006 to 2009. However, the pass rate for the new bar 
examination is a lagged variable and so data used in the regression estimations is the 
three years period 2007-2009. Sixty-eight new law schools commenced operation in 
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2004 with another six openings in 2005. Accordingly, students from 68 law schools 
could apply for the new bar examination in 2006. Hence, the observations of the lagged 
pass rate in the examination used for the estimations of 2007 are fewer than in other 
years. Furthermore, other control variables such as TUIT, SCAL and NPROF were not 
available from some law schools, resulting in a reduction of the sample used for the 
estimations.  
      
3.2. Function form 
To examine the arguments in the previous section, the estimated function takes the 
following form: 
 
Ln(NAPLI) it=α0+α1PASRATi,t-1 +α2PASRATi,t-1*PRESi+α3Ln(TUIT)it + 4Ln(SCAL)it + 
5SLn(NPROF)it + νi +ωit , 
 
where NAPLI represents the number of applicants for the law school i in year t, and ’s 
represents the regression parameters. PASRATit-1 denotes the law school’s pass rate of 
the new bar examination in year t-1. νi represents the constant individual-level specific 
effects and ωit  is the standard error. To account for unobserved individual-level specific 
effects, the Fixed Effects model is employed. This model allows νi  to be correlated 
with the independent variables, and the constant individual-specific effects νi are 
differenced out (Baltagi, 2005). TUIT is included to capture the cost of the law school. 
SCAL and NPROF are incorporated to capture the scale of the law school. Besides 
PASRATi, all variables are log-form. Based on the definition of a “prestigious law 
school” as explained in the previous section, PRESi and the cross term of PRESi with 
PASRAT are constructed. In the following section, added to the estimation results of the 
Fixed effects model, those of the OLS model are presented. 
 
4. Results. 
   
Table 2 exhibits the results of OLS estimation. Table 3 presents the results of the 
Fixed effects estimation. The differences in the observations among estimations are 
because some universities did not disclose some control variables. Looking at Table 2 
tells us that PASRAT yields positive signs that are significant at the 1 % level in all 
estimations. Hence, the pass rate has a positive effect on applicants to the law schools. 
Signs of PRES are not the same, indicating that the effect of the “brand” of the law 
school is ambiguous. Looking at columns (4)-(6) reveals that signs of PASRAT* PRES 
are unstable and do not become statistically significant. As shown in columns (1) and 
(4), SCAL becomes the statistically positive at the 1 % level. 
As shown in Table 3 where PRES disappears because unobserved fixed effects have 
been controlled for, PASRAT continues to produce a positive sign and be statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. The combined results of PASRAT shown in Tables 2 and 3 
reveal that the pass rate in the new bar examination has an important role in increasing 
applicants to the law school in the following year. SCAL continues to yield a statistically 
positive sign. SCAL results in Tables 2 and 3 imply that the scale of a law school is 
positively associated with its number of applicants. Coefficient values of PASRAT as 
well as SCAL in Table 3 are far smaller than those in Table 2. It follows from this that 
unobserved law school characteristics lead to an upwards bias for these variables 
although their effects continue to be significant. As appears in columns (4)-(6), it is 
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interesting to observe that the signs of PASRAT* PRES are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in all columns, which is remarkably different from the 
results in Table 2. The evidence provide by the results of the Fixed effects model is that, 
even after controlling for the fixed effects of a law school, the “brand” of a “prestigious 
law school” augments the pass rate effect on the number of applicants. From this I can 
derive the argument that the pass rate in the new bar examination has a greater positive 
effect on increase of demand for “prestigious law schools” than for the other law 
schools.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This analyzes how the current performance of a law school affects the demand for 
places in it under conditions affecting the recently developed law school market in 
Japan. This note also explores how a university’s prestigious position under conditions 
of the old bar examination is related to the effect of its current performance. After 
controlling for a university’s fixed effect, the major findings are as follows: The higher 
the law school’s pass rate in the new bar examination, the larger the number of 
applicants for the law school in the following year. What is more, the positive effect of 
the pass rate on demand for the law school is larger for a prestigious university’s law 
school than for other law schools. This implies that the relationship between the “brand” 
and its current performance is complimentary when I consider the determinants of 
demand for the law school under conditions of the newly introduced bar examination. 
That is to say, a high pass rate enhances the favored “brand” of the law school. On the 
other hand, the pass rates of the “prestigious law schools” in the new bar examination 
are higher those of the other law schools. Combining these results makes it evident that 
the universities that had entrenched their “brand” before establishing a law school had a 
great advantage for surviving in the new environment of the newly developed law 
school market.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
NAPLI Number of applicants for the entrance examination of 
a law school.
 
524 605 23  3864 
PASRAT_1 Rate of successful candidates for the new bar 
examination in the previous year (%) 
0.31 0.18 0 1 
PRES Prestigious law school dummy. Takes 1 if one is a 
prestigious law school, otherwise 0.
a  
0.14 ---- ---- ---- 
SCAL The law school’s quota for the entrance examination  114 31 20 300 
TUIT Tuition (Thousands of yen) 
 
1142 316 656 2250 
NPROF Number of full-time professors 
 
22 11 10 78 
Notes: a. Instead of a mean value for the prestigious law school dummy, the rate of prestigious law schools over total law schools is reported in the third 
column.  
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TABLE 2 
Determinants of the number of applicants for a law school  
(OLS model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  
PASRAT_1 1.65** 
(5.26) 
3.08** 
(5.75) 
2.71** 
(5.29) 
1.70** 
(5.05) 
3.14** 
(5.39) 
2.69** 
(4.94) 
PASRAT_1* 
PRES 
   
 
-0.82 
(-1.14) 
-0.79 
(-0.92) 
0.22 
(0.24) 
PRES 
 
-0.49** 
(-4.35) 
0.74** 
(4.21) 
0.68** 
(3.58) 
-0.08 
(-0.23) 
1.14** 
(3.05) 
0.57 
(1.28) 
Ln(TUIT) 
 
-0.20 
(-1.17) 
0.94** 
(4.35) 
 -0.18 
(-1.03) 
0.96** 
(4.33) 
 
Ln(SCAL) 1.78** 
(10.8) 
  1.77** 
(10.5) 
  
Ln(NPROF) -0.38* 
(-2.00) 
  -0.37* 
(-1.92) 
  
R-square 0.73 0.39 0.37 
 
0.74 0.39 0.37 
 
Number of 
Observations 
187 192 198 187 192 198 
 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values calculated using a robust standard error. ** and * mean statistically significance at the 1 % and 5% levels, 
respectively. A constant is included in all estimations, but not reported to save space. 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of the number of applicants to a law school  
(Fixed effects model) 
Variables (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  
PASRAT_1 0.85** 
(4.13) 
0.89** 
(4.27) 
0.88** 
(4.34) 
0.76** 
(4.13) 
0.78** 
(3.61) 
0.77** 
(3.66) 
PASRAT_1* 
PRES 
   0.80** 
(2.97) 
0.94** 
(3.14) 
0.96** 
(3.26) 
Ln(TUIT) 
 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.18 
(0.41) 
 0.14 
(0.30) 
0.15 
(0.32) 
 
Ln(SCAL) 0.26** 
(2.55) 
  0.26** 
(2.84) 
  
Ln(NPROF) 0.20 
(0.72) 
  0.19 
(0.69) 
  
R-square 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.18 
 
Number of 
Observations 
187 192 198 187 192 198 
 
Notes:  74 law schools exist and their fixed effects are controlled for. Numbers in parentheses are t-values calculated using the robust standard error. ** and * 
mean statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% levels, respectively.  
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FIGURE 1 
Pass rates for the new bar examination 
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FIGURE 2 
Total number of applicants for entrance examinations of law schools.  
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FIGURE 3 
Relationship between the pass rate in the new bar exam and applicants for law schools.  
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(a) Prestigious law schools. 
 
 
 
(b) Non-prestigious law schools. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Relationship between the pass rate in the new bar exam and applicants for law schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
